RFC 5534 Failure Detection and Locator Pair Exploration Protocol for IPv6 Multihoming

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PROPOSED STANDARD

Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Request for Comments: 5534                                      Ericsson
Category: Standards Track                                 I. van Beijnum
                                                          IMDEA Networks
                                                               June 2009


                   Failure Detection and Locator Pair
               Exploration Protocol for IPv6 Multihoming

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
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   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
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   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Abstract

   This document specifies how the level 3 multihoming Shim6 protocol
   (Shim6) detects failures between two communicating nodes.  It also
   specifies an exploration protocol for switching to another pair of
   interfaces and/or addresses between the same nodes if a failure
   occurs and an operational pair can be found.



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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
   2. Requirements Language ...........................................4
   3. Definitions .....................................................4
      3.1. Available Addresses ........................................4
      3.2. Locally Operational Addresses ..............................5
      3.3. Operational Address Pairs ..................................5
      3.4. Primary Address Pair .......................................7
      3.5. Current Address Pair .......................................7
   4. Protocol Overview ...............................................8
      4.1. Failure Detection ..........................................8
      4.2. Full Reachability Exploration .............................10
      4.3. Exploration Order .........................................11
   5. Protocol Definition ............................................13
      5.1. Keepalive Message .........................................13
      5.2. Probe Message .............................................14
      5.3. Keepalive Timeout Option Format ...........................18
   6. Behavior .......................................................19
      6.1. Incoming Payload Packet ...................................20
      6.2. Outgoing Payload Packet ...................................21
      6.3. Keepalive Timeout .........................................21
      6.4. Send Timeout ..............................................22
      6.5. Retransmission ............................................22
      6.6. Reception of the Keepalive Message ........................22
      6.7. Reception of the Probe Message State=Exploring ............23
      6.8. Reception of the Probe Message State=InboundOk ............23
      6.9. Reception of the Probe Message State=Operational ..........23
      6.10. Graphical Representation of the State Machine ............24
   7. Protocol Constants and Variables ...............................24
   8. Security Considerations ........................................25
   9. Operational Considerations .....................................27
   10. References ....................................................28
      10.1. Normative References .....................................28
      10.2. Informative References ...................................29
   Appendix A. Example Protocol Runs..................................30
   Appendix B. Contributors...........................................35
   Appendix C. Acknowledgements.......................................35













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1.  Introduction

   The Shim6 protocol [RFC5533] extends IPv6 to support multihoming.  It
   is an IP-layer mechanism that hides multihoming from applications.  A
   part of the Shim6 solution involves detecting when a currently used
   pair of addresses (or interfaces) between two communication nodes has
   failed and picking another pair when this occurs.  We call the former
   "failure detection", and the latter, "locator pair exploration".

   This document specifies the mechanisms and protocol messages to
   achieve both failure detection and locator pair exploration.  This
   part of the Shim6 protocol is called the REAchability Protocol
   (REAP).

   Failure detection is made as lightweight as possible.  Payload data
   traffic in both directions is observed, and in the case where there
   is no traffic because the communication is idle, failure detection is
   also idle and doesn't generate any packets.  When payload traffic is
   flowing in both directions, there is no need to send failure
   detection packets, either.  Only when there is traffic in one
   direction does the failure detection mechanism generate keepalives in
   the other direction.  As a result, whenever there is outgoing traffic
   and no incoming return traffic or keepalives, there must be failure,
   at which point the locator pair exploration is performed to find a
   working address pair for each direction.

   This document is structured as follows: Section 3 defines a set of
   useful terms, Section 4 gives an overview of REAP, and Section 5
   provides a detailed definition.  Section 6 specifies behavior, and
   Section 7 discusses protocol constants.  Section 8 discusses the
   security considerations of REAP.

   In this specification, we consider an address to be synonymous with a
   locator.  Other parts of the Shim6 protocol ensure that the different
   locators used by a node actually belong together.  That is, REAP is
   not responsible for ensuring that said node ends up with a legitimate
   locator.

   REAP has been designed to be used with Shim6 and is therefore
   tailored to an environment where it typically runs on hosts, uses
   widely varying types of paths, and is unaware of application context.
   As a result, REAP attempts to be as self-configuring and unobtrusive
   as possible.  In particular, it avoids sending any packets except
   where absolutely required and employs exponential back-off to avoid
   congestion.  The downside is that it cannot offer the same
   granularity of detecting problems as mechanisms that have more
   application context and ability to negotiate or configure parameters.




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   Future versions of this specification may consider extensions with
   such capabilities, for instance, through inheriting some mechanisms
   from the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol [BFD].

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Definitions

   This section defines terms useful for discussing failure detection
   and locator pair exploration.

3.1.  Available Addresses

   Shim6 nodes need to be aware of what addresses they themselves have.
   If a node loses the address it is currently using for communications,
   another address must replace it.  And if a node loses an address that
   the node's peer knows about, the peer must be informed.  Similarly,
   when a node acquires a new address it may generally wish the peer to
   know about it.

   Definition.  Available address - an address is said to be available
   if all the following conditions are fulfilled:

   o  The address has been assigned to an interface of the node.

   o  The valid lifetime of the prefix (Section 4.6.2 of RFC 4861
      [RFC4861]) associated with the address has not expired.

   o  The address is not tentative in the sense of RFC 4862 [RFC4862].
      In other words, the address assignment is complete so that
      communications can be started.

      Note that this explicitly allows an address to be optimistic in
      the sense of Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
      [RFC4429] even though implementations may prefer using other
      addresses as long as there is an alternative.

   o  The address is a global unicast or unique local address [RFC4193].
      That is, it is not an IPv6 site-local or link-local address.

      With link-local addresses, the nodes would be unable to determine
      on which link the given address is usable.





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   o  The address and interface are acceptable for use according to a
      local policy.

   Available addresses are discovered and monitored through mechanisms
   outside the scope of Shim6.  Shim6 implementations MUST be able to
   employ information provided by IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861],
   Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4862], and DHCP [RFC3315] (when DHCP is
   implemented).  This information includes the availability of a new
   address and status changes of existing addresses (such as when an
   address becomes invalid).

3.2.  Locally Operational Addresses

   Two different granularity levels are needed for failure detection.
   The coarser granularity is for individual addresses.

   Definition.  Locally operational address - an available address is
   said to be locally operational when its use is known to be possible
   locally.  In other words, when the interface is up, a default router
   (if needed) suitable for this address is known to be reachable, and
   no other local information points to the address being unusable.

   Locally operational addresses are discovered and monitored through
   mechanisms outside the Shim6 protocol.  Shim6 implementations MUST be
   able to employ information provided from Neighbor Unreachability
   Detection [RFC4861].  Implementations MAY also employ additional,
   link-layer-specific mechanisms.

      Note 1: A part of the problem in ensuring that an address is
      operational is making sure that after a change in link-layer
      connectivity, we are still connected to the same IP subnet.
      Mechanisms such as [DNA-SIM] can be used to ensure this.

      Note 2: In theory, it would also be possible for nodes to learn
      about routing failures for a particular selected source prefix, if
      only suitable protocols for this purpose existed.  Some proposals
      in this space have been made (see, for instance [ADD-SEL] and
      [MULTI6]), but none have been standardized to date.

3.3.  Operational Address Pairs

   The existence of locally operational addresses are not, however, a
   guarantee that communications can be established with the peer.  A
   failure in the routing infrastructure can prevent packets from
   reaching their destination.  For this reason, we need the definition
   of a second level of granularity, which is used for pairs of
   addresses.




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   Definition.  Bidirectionally operational address pair - a pair of
   locally operational addresses are said to be an operational address
   pair when bidirectional connectivity can be shown between the
   addresses.  That is, a packet sent with one of the addresses in the
   Source field and the other in the Destination field reaches the
   destination, and vice versa.

   Unfortunately, there are scenarios where bidirectionally operational
   address pairs do not exist.  For instance, ingress filtering or
   network failures may result in one address pair being operational in
   one direction while another one is operational from the other
   direction.  The following definition captures this general situation.

   Definition.  Unidirectionally operational address pair - a pair of
   locally operational addresses are said to be a unidirectionally
   operational address pair when packets sent with the first address as
   the source and the second address as the destination reach the
   destination.

   Shim6 implementations MUST support the discovery of operational
   address pairs through the use of explicit reachability tests and
   Forced Bidirectional Communication (FBD), described later in this
   specification.  Future extensions of Shim6 may specify additional
   mechanisms.  Some ideas of such mechanisms are listed below but are
   not fully specified in this document:

   o  Positive feedback from upper-layer protocols.  For instance, TCP
      can indicate to the IP layer that it is making progress.  This is
      similar to how IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection can, in some
      cases, be avoided when upper layers provide information about
      bidirectional connectivity [RFC4861].

      In the case of unidirectional connectivity, the upper-layer
      protocol responses come back using another address pair, but show
      that the messages sent using the first address pair have been
      received.

   o  Negative feedback from upper-layer protocols.  It is conceivable
      that upper-layer protocols give an indication of a problem to the
      multihoming layer.  For instance, TCP could indicate that there's
      either congestion or lack of connectivity in the path because it
      is not getting ACKs.

   o  ICMP error messages.  Given the ease of spoofing ICMP messages,
      one should be careful not to trust these blindly, however.  One
      approach would be to use ICMP error messages only as a hint to
      perform an explicit reachability test or to move an address pair
      to a lower place in the list of address pairs to be probed, but



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      not to use these messages as a reason to disrupt ongoing
      communications without other indications of problems.  The
      situation may be different when certain verifications of the ICMP
      messages are being performed, as explained by Gont in [GONT].
      These verifications can ensure that (practically) only on-path
      attackers can spoof the messages.

3.4.  Primary Address Pair

   The primary address pair consists of the addresses that upper-layer
   protocols use in their interaction with the Shim6 layer.  Use of the
   primary address pair means that the communication is compatible with
   regular non-Shim6 communication and that no context tag needs to be
   present.

3.5.  Current Address Pair

   Shim6 needs to avoid sending packets that belong to the same
   transport connection concurrently over multiple paths.  This is
   because congestion control in commonly used transport protocols is
   based upon a notion of a single path.  While routing can introduce
   path changes as well and transport protocols have means to deal with
   this, frequent changes will cause problems.  Effective congestion
   control over multiple paths is considered a research topic at the
   time of publication of this document.  Shim6 does not attempt to
   employ multiple paths simultaneously.

      Note: The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and future
      multipath transport protocols are likely to require interaction
      with Shim6, at least to ensure that they do not employ Shim6
      unexpectedly.

   For these reasons, it is necessary to choose a particular pair of
   addresses as the current address pair that will be used until
   problems occur, at least for the same session.

      It is theoretically possible to support multiple current address
      pairs for different transport sessions or Shim6 contexts.
      However, this is not supported in this version of the Shim6
      protocol.

   A current address pair need not be operational at all times.  If
   there is no traffic to send, we may not know if the current address
   pair is operational.  Nevertheless, it makes sense to assume that the
   address pair that worked previously continues to be operational for
   new communications as well.





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4.  Protocol Overview

   This section discusses the design of the reachability detection and
   full reachability exploration mechanisms, and gives an overview of
   the REAP protocol.

   Exploring the full set of communication options between two nodes
   that both have two or more addresses is an expensive operation as the
   number of combinations to be explored increases very quickly with the
   number of addresses.  For instance, with two addresses on both sides,
   there are four possible address pairs.  Since we can't assume that
   reachability in one direction automatically means reachability for
   the complement pair in the other direction, the total number of two-
   way combinations is eight.  (Combinations = nA * nB * 2.)

   An important observation in multihoming is that failures are
   relatively infrequent, so an operational pair that worked a few
   seconds ago is very likely to still be operational.  Thus, it makes
   sense to have a lightweight protocol that confirms existing
   reachability, and to only invoke heavier exploration mechanism when
   there is a suspected failure.

4.1.  Failure Detection

   Failure detection consists of three parts: tracking local
   information, tracking remote peer status, and finally verifying
   reachability.  Tracking local information consists of using, for
   instance, reachability information about the local router as an
   input.  Nodes SHOULD employ techniques listed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2
   to track the local situation.  It is also necessary to track remote
   address information from the peer.  For instance, if the peer's
   address in the current address pair is no longer locally operational,
   a mechanism to relay that information is needed.  The Update Request
   message in the Shim6 protocol is used for this purpose [RFC5533].
   Finally, when the local and remote information indicates that
   communication should be possible and there are upper-layer packets to
   be sent, reachability verification is necessary to ensure that the
   peers actually have an operational address pair.

   A technique called Forced Bidirectional Detection (FBD) is employed
   for the reachability verification.  Reachability for the currently
   used address pair in a Shim6 context is determined by making sure
   that whenever there is payload traffic in one direction, there is
   also traffic in the other direction.  This can be data traffic as
   well, or it may be transport-layer acknowledgments or a REAP
   reachability keepalive if there is no other traffic.  This way, it is
   no longer possible to have traffic in only one direction; so whenever




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   there is payload traffic going out, but there are no return packets,
   there must be a failure, and the full exploration mechanism is
   started.

   A more detailed description of the current pair-reachability
   evaluation mechanism:

   1.  To prevent the other side from concluding that there is a
       reachability failure, it's necessary for a node implementing the
       failure-detection mechanism to generate periodic keepalives when
       there is no other traffic.

       FBD works by generating REAP keepalives if the node is receiving
       packets from its peer but not sending any of its own.  The
       keepalives are sent at certain intervals so that the other side
       knows there is a reachability problem when it doesn't receive any
       incoming packets for the duration of a Send Timeout period.  The
       node communicates its Send Timeout value to the peer as a
       Keepalive Timeout Option (Section 5.3) in the I2, I2bis, R2, or
       UPDATE messages.  The peer then maps this value to its Keepalive
       Timeout value.

       The interval after which keepalives are sent is named the
       Keepalive Interval.  The RECOMMENDED approach for the Keepalive
       Interval is to send keepalives at one-half to one-third of the
       Keepalive Timeout interval, so that multiple keepalives are
       generated and have time to reach the peer before it times out.

   2.  Whenever outgoing payload packets are generated, a timer is
       started to reflect the requirement that the peer should generate
       return traffic from payload packets.  The timeout value is set to
       the value of Send Timeout.

       For the purposes of this specification, "payload packet" refers
       to any packet that is part of a Shim6 context, including both
       upper-layer protocol packets and Shim6 protocol messages, except
       those defined in this specification.  For the latter messages,
       Section 6 specifies what happens to the timers when a message is
       transmitted or received.

   3.  Whenever incoming payload packets are received, the timer
       associated with the return traffic from the peer is stopped, and
       another timer is started to reflect the requirement for this node
       to generate return traffic.  This timeout value is set to the
       value of Keepalive Timeout.






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       These two timers are mutually exclusive.  In other words, either
       the node is expecting to see traffic from the peer based on the
       traffic that the node sent earlier or the node is expecting to
       respond to the peer based on the traffic that the peer sent
       earlier (otherwise, the node is in an idle state).

   4.  The reception of a REAP Keepalive message leads to stopping the
       timer associated with the return traffic from the peer.

   5.  Keepalive Interval seconds after the last payload packet has been
       received for a context, if no other packet has been sent within
       this context since the payload packet has been received, a REAP
       Keepalive message is generated for the context in question and
       transmitted to the peer.  A node may send the keepalive sooner
       than Keepalive Interval seconds if implementation considerations
       warrant this, but should take care to avoid sending keepalives at
       an excessive rate.  REAP Keepalive messages SHOULD continue to be
       sent at the Keepalive Interval until either a payload packet in
       the Shim6 context has been received from the peer or the
       Keepalive Timeout expires.  Keepalives are not sent at all if one
       or more payload packets were sent within the Keepalive Interval.

   6.  Send Timeout seconds after the transmission of a payload packet
       with no return traffic on this context, a full reachability
       exploration is started.

   Section 7 provides some suggested defaults for these timeout values.
   The actual value SHOULD be randomized in order to prevent
   synchronization.  Experience from the deployment of the Shim6
   protocol is needed in order to determine what values are most
   suitable.

4.2.  Full Reachability Exploration

   As explained in previous sections, the currently used address pair
   may become invalid, either through one of the addresses becoming
   unavailable or nonoperational or through the pair itself being
   declared nonoperational.  An exploration process attempts to find
   another operational pair so that communications can resume.

   What makes this process hard is the requirement to support
   unidirectionally operational address pairs.  It is insufficient to
   probe address pairs by a simple request-response protocol.  Instead,
   the party that first detects the problem starts a process where it
   tries each of the different address pairs in turn by sending a
   message to its peer.  These messages carry information about the
   state of connectivity between the peers, such as whether the sender
   has seen any traffic from the peer recently.  When the peer receives



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   a message that indicates a problem, it assists the process by
   starting its own parallel exploration to the other direction, again
   sending information about the recently received payload traffic or
   signaling messages.

   Specifically, when A decides that it needs to explore for an
   alternative address pair to B, it will initiate a set of Probe
   messages, in sequence, until it gets a Probe message from B
   indicating that (a) B has received one of A's messages and,
   obviously, (b) that B's Probe message gets back to A.  B uses the
   same algorithm, but starts the process from the reception of the
   first Probe message from A.

   Upon changing to a new address pair, the network path traversed most
   likely has changed, so the upper-layer protocol (ULP), SHOULD be
   informed.  This can be a signal for the ULP to adapt, due to the
   change in path, so that for example, if the ULP is TCP, it could
   initiate a slow start procedure.  However, it's likely that the
   circumstances that led to the selection of a new path already caused
   enough packet loss to trigger slow start.

   REAP is designed to support failure recovery even in the case of
   having only unidirectionally operational address pairs.  However, due
   to security concerns discussed in Section 8, the exploration process
   can typically be run only for a session that has already been
   established.  Specifically, while REAP would in theory be capable of
   exploration even during connection establishment, its use within the
   Shim6 protocol does not allow this.

4.3.  Exploration Order

   The exploration process assumes an ability to choose address pairs
   for testing.  An overview of the choosing process used by REAP is as
   follows:

   o  As an input to start the process, the node has knowledge of its
      own addresses and has been told via Shim6 protocol messages what
      the addresses of the peer are.  A list of possible pairs of
      addresses can be constructed by combining the two pieces of
      information.

   o  By employing standard IPv6 address selection rules, the list is
      pruned by removing combinations that are inappropriate, such as
      attempting to use a link-local address when contacting a peer that
      uses a global unicast address.

   o  Similarly, standard IPv6 address selection rules provide a basic
      priority order for the pairs.



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   o  Local preferences may be applied for some additional tuning of the
      order in the list.  The mechanisms for local preference settings
      are not specified but can involve, for instance, configuration
      that sets the preference for using one interface over another.

   o  As a result, the node has a prioritized list of address pairs to
      try.  However, the list may still be long, as there may be a
      combinatorial explosion when there are many addresses on both
      sides.  REAP employs these pairs sequentially, however, and uses a
      back-off procedure to avoid a "signaling storm".  This ensures
      that the exploration process is relatively conservative or "safe".
      The tradeoff is that finding a working path may take time if there
      are many addresses on both sides.

   In more detail, the process is as follows.  Nodes first consult the
   RFC 3484 default address selection rules [RFC3484] to determine what
   combinations of addresses are allowed from a local point of view, as
   this reduces the search space.  RFC 3484 also provides a priority
   ordering among different address pairs, possibly making the search
   faster.  (Additional mechanisms may be defined in the future for
   arriving at an initial ordering of address pairs before testing
   starts [PAIR].)  Nodes may also use local information, such as known
   quality of service parameters or interface types, to determine what
   addresses are preferred over others, and try pairs containing such
   addresses first.  The Shim6 protocol also carries preference
   information in its messages.

   Out of the set of possible candidate address pairs, nodes SHOULD
   attempt to test through all of them until an operational pair is
   found, and retry the process as necessary.  However, all nodes MUST
   perform this process sequentially and with exponential back-off.
   This sequential process is necessary in order to avoid a "signaling
   storm" when an outage occurs (particularly for a complete site).
   However, it also limits the number of addresses that can, in
   practice, be used for multihoming, considering that transport- and
   application-layer protocols will fail if the switch to a new address
   pair takes too long.

   Section 7 suggests default values for the timers associated with the
   exploration process.  The value Initial Probe Timeout (0.5 seconds)
   specifies the interval between initial attempts to send probes; the
   Number of Initial Probes (4) specifies how many initial probes can be
   sent before the exponential back-off procedure needs to be employed.
   This process increases the time between every probe if there is no
   response.  Typically, each increase doubles the time, but this
   specification does not mandate a particular increase.





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      Note: The rationale for sending four packets at a fixed rate
      before the exponential back-off is employed is to avoid having to
      send these packets excessively fast.  Without this, having 0.5
      seconds between the third and fourth probe means that the time
      between the first and second probe would have to be 0.125 seconds,
      which gives very little time for a reply to the first packet to
      arrive.  Also, this means that the first four packets are sent
      within 0.875 seconds rather than 2 seconds, increasing the
      potential for congestion if a large number of Shim6 contexts need
      to send probes at the same time after a failure.

   Finally, Max Probe Timeout (60 seconds) specifies a limit beyond
   which the probe interval may not grow.  If the exploration process
   reaches this interval, it will continue sending at this rate until a
   suitable response is triggered or the Shim6 context is garbage
   collected, because upper-layer protocols using the Shim6 context in
   question are no longer attempting to send packets.  Reaching the Max
   Probe Timeout may also serve as a hint to the garbage collection
   process that the context is no longer usable.

5.  Protocol Definition

5.1.  Keepalive Message

   The format of the Keepalive message is as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  |0|  Type = 66  |  Reserved1  |0|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Checksum           |R|                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                             |
   |                    Receiver Context Tag                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Reserved2                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                            Options                            +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header, Hdr Ext Len, 0, 0, Checksum
      These are as specified in Section 5.3 of the Shim6 protocol
      description [RFC5533].






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   Type
      This field identifies the Keepalive message and MUST be set to 66
      (Keepalive).

   Reserved1
      This is a 7-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero
      on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   R
      This is a 1-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero
      on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   Receiver Context Tag
      This is a 47-bit field for the context tag that the receiver has
      allocated for the context.

   Reserved2
      This is a 32-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero
      on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   Options
      This field MAY contain one or more Shim6 options.  However, there
      are currently no defined options that are useful in a Keepalive
      message.  The Options field is provided only for future
      extensibility reasons.

   A valid message conforms to the format above, has a Receiver Context
   Tag that matches the context known by the receiver, is a valid Shim6
   control message as defined in Section 12.3 of the Shim6 protocol
   description [RFC5533], and has a Shim6 context that is in state
   ESTABLISHED.  The receiver processes a valid message by inspecting
   its options and executing any actions specified for such options.

   The processing rules for this message are given in more detail in
   Section 6.

5.2.  Probe Message

   This message performs REAP exploration.  Its format is as follows:












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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  |0|  Type = 67  |   Reserved  |0|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Checksum           |R|                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                             |
   |                    Receiver Context Tag                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Precvd| Psent |Sta|                 Reserved2                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      First probe sent                         +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Source address                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      First probe sent                         +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      First Probe Nonce                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      First Probe Data                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /                                                               /
   /                      Nth probe sent                           /
   |                                                               |
   +                      Source address                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      Nth probe sent                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Nth Probe Nonce                          |



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   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Nth Probe Data                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      First probe received                     +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Source address                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      First probe received                     +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      First Probe Nonce                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      First Probe Data                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      Nth probe received                       +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Source address                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                      Nth probe received                       +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Nth Probe Nonce                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Nth Probe Data                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                         Options                             //
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+






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   Next Header, Hdr Ext Len, 0, 0, Checksum
      These are as specified in Section 5.3 of the Shim6 protocol
      description [RFC5533].

   Type
      This field identifies the Probe message and MUST be set to 67
      (Probe).

   Reserved
      This is a 7-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero
      on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   R
      This is a 1-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero
      on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   Receiver Context Tag
      This is a 47-bit field for the context tag that the receiver has
      allocated for the context.

   Psent
      This is a 4-bit field that indicates the number of sent probes
      included in this Probe message.  The first set of Probe fields
      pertains to the current message and MUST be present, so the
      minimum value for this field is 1.  Additional sent Probe fields
      are copies of the same fields sent in (recent) earlier probes and
      may be included or omitted as per any logic employed by the
      implementation.

   Precvd
      This is a 4-bit field that indicates the number of received probes
      included in this Probe message.  Received Probe fields are copies
      of the same fields in earlier received probes that arrived since
      the last transition to state Exploring.  When a sender is in state
      InboundOk it MUST include copies of the fields of at least one of
      the inbound probes.  A sender MAY include additional sets of these
      received Probe fields in any state as per any logic employed by
      the implementation.

      The fields Probe Source, Probe Destination, Probe Nonce, and Probe
      Data may be repeated, depending on the value of Psent and
      Preceived.

   Sta (State)
      This 2-bit State field is used to inform the peer about the state
      of the sender.  It has three legal values:





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      0 (Operational) implies that the sender both (a) believes it has
      no problem communicating and (b) believes that the recipient also
      has no problem communicating.

      1 (Exploring) implies that the sender has a problem communicating
      with the recipient, e.g., it has not seen any traffic from the
      recipient even when it expected some.

      2 (InboundOk) implies that the sender believes it has no problem
      communicating, i.e., it at least sees packets from the recipient
      but that the recipient either has a problem or has not yet
      confirmed to the sender that the problem has been resolved.

   Reserved2
      MUST be set to zero upon transmission and MUST be ignored upon
      reception.

   Probe Source
      This 128-bit field contains the source IPv6 address used to send
      the probe.

   Probe Destination
      This 128-bit field contains the destination IPv6 address used to
      send the probe.

   Probe Nonce
      This is a 32-bit field that is initialized by the sender with a
      value that allows it to determine with which sent probes a
      received probe correlates.  It is highly RECOMMENDED that the
      Nonce field be at least moderately hard to guess so that even on-
      path attackers can't deduce the next nonce value that will be
      used.  This value SHOULD be generated using a random number
      generator that is known to have good randomness properties as
      outlined in RFC 4086 [RFC4086].

   Probe Data
      This is a 32-bit field with no fixed meaning.  The Probe Data
      field is copied back with no changes.  Future flags may define a
      use for this field.

   Options
      For future extensions.

5.3.  Keepalive Timeout Option Format

   Either side of a Shim6 context can notify the peer of the value that
   it would prefer the peer to use as its Keepalive Timeout value.  If
   the node is using a non-default Send Timeout value, it MUST



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   communicate this value as a Keepalive Timeout value to the peer in
   the below option.  This option MAY be sent in the I2, I2bis, R2, or
   UPDATE messages.  The option SHOULD only need to be sent once in a
   given Shim6 association.  If a node receives this option, it SHOULD
   update its Keepalive Timeout value for the peer.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Type = 10         |0|        Length  = 4            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   +           Reserved            |      Keepalive Timeout        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Fields:

   Type
      This field identifies the option and MUST be set to 10 (Keepalive
      Timeout).

   Length
      This field MUST be set as specified in Section 5.1 of the Shim6
      protocol description [RFC5533] -- that is, set to 4.

   Reserved
      A 16-bit field reserved for future use.  It is set to zero upon
      transmit and MUST be ignored upon receipt.

   Keepalive Timeout
      The value in seconds corresponding to the suggested Keepalive
      Timeout value for the peer.

6.  Behavior

   The required behavior of REAP nodes is specified below in the form of
   a state machine.  The externally observable behavior of an
   implementation MUST conform to this state machine, but there is no
   requirement that the implementation actually employ a state machine.
   Intermixed with the following description, we also provide a state
   machine description in tabular form.  However, that form is only
   informational.

   On a given context with a given peer, the node can be in one of three
   states: Operational, Exploring, or InboundOK.  In the Operational
   state, the underlying address pairs are assumed to be operational.
   In the Exploring state, this node hasn't seen any traffic from the
   peer for more than a Send Timer period.  Finally, in the InboundOK




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   state, this node sees traffic from the peer, but the peer may not yet
   see any traffic from this node, so the exploration process needs to
   continue.

   The node also maintains the Send Timer (Send Timeout seconds) and
   Keepalive Timer (Keepalive Timeout seconds).  The Send Timer reflects
   the requirement that when this node sends a payload packet, there
   should be some return traffic (either payload packets or Keepalive
   messages) within Send Timeout seconds.  The Keepalive Timer reflects
   the requirement that when this node receives a payload packet, there
   should a similar response towards the peer.  The Keepalive Timer is
   only used within the Operational state, and the Send Timer within the
   Operational and InboundOK states.  No timer is running in the
   Exploring state.  As explained in Section 4.1, the two timers are
   mutually exclusive.  That is, either the Keepalive Timer or the Send
   Timer is running, or neither of them is running.

   Note that Appendix A gives some examples of typical protocol runs in
   order to illustrate the behavior.

6.1.  Incoming Payload Packet

   Upon the reception of a payload packet in the Operational state, the
   node starts the Keepalive Timer if it was not yet running, and stops
   the Send Timer if it was running.

   If the node is in the Exploring state, it transitions to the
   InboundOK state, sends a Probe message, and starts the Send Timer.
   It fills the Psent and corresponding Probe Source Address, Probe
   Destination Address, Probe Nonce, and Probe Data fields with
   information about recent Probe messages that have not yet been
   reported as seen by the peer.  It also fills the Precvd and
   corresponding Probe Source Address, Probe Destination Address, Probe
   Nonce, and Probe Data fields with information about recent Probe
   messages it has seen from the peer.  When sending a Probe message,
   the State field MUST be set to a value that matches the conceptual
   state of the sender after sending the Probe.  In this case, the node
   therefore sets the State field to 2 (InboundOk).  The IP source and
   destination addresses for sending the Probe message are selected as
   discussed in Section 4.3.

   In the InboundOK state, the node stops the Send Timer if it was
   running, but does not do anything else.

   The reception of Shim6 control messages other than the Keepalive and
   Probe messages are treated the same as the reception of payload
   packets.




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   While the Keepalive Timer is running, the node SHOULD send Keepalive
   messages to the peer with an interval of Keepalive Interval seconds.
   Conceptually, a separate timer is used to distinguish between the
   interval between Keepalive messages and the overall Keepalive Timeout
   interval.  However, this separate timer is not modelled in the
   tabular or graphical state machines.  When sent, the Keepalive
   message is constructed as described in Section 5.1.  It is sent using
   the current address pair.

   In the below tables, "START", "RESTART", and "STOP" refer to
   starting, restarting, and stopping the Keepalive Timer or the Send
   Timer, respectively.  "GOTO" refers to transitioning to another
   state.  "SEND" refers to sending a message, and "-" refers to taking
   no action.

    Operational           Exploring               InboundOk
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    STOP Send             SEND Probe InboundOk    STOP Send
    START Keepalive       START Send
                          GOTO InboundOk

6.2.  Outgoing Payload Packet

   Upon sending a payload packet in the Operational state, the node
   stops the Keepalive Timer if it was running and starts the Send Timer
   if it was not running.  In the Exploring state there is no effect,
   and in the InboundOK state the node simply starts the Send Timer if
   it was not yet running.  (The sending of Shim6 control messages is
   again treated the same.)

     Operational             Exploring             InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     START Send              -                     START Send
     STOP Keepalive

6.3.  Keepalive Timeout

   Upon a timeout on the Keepalive Timer, the node sends one last
   Keepalive message.  This can only happen in the Operational state.

   The Keepalive message is constructed as described in Section 5.1.  It
   is sent using the current address pair.

     Operational             Exploring             InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     SEND Keepalive          -                     -





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6.4.  Send Timeout

   Upon a timeout on the Send Timer, the node enters the Exploring state
   and sends a Probe message.  The Probe message is constructed as
   explained in Section 6.1, except that the State field is set to 1
   (Exploring).

     Operational             Exploring             InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     SEND Probe Exploring    -                     SEND Probe Exploring
     GOTO Exploring                                GOTO Exploring

6.5.  Retransmission

   While in the Exploring state, the node keeps retransmitting its Probe
   messages to different (or the same) addresses as defined in
   Section 4.3.  A similar process is employed in the InboundOk state,
   except that upon such retransmission, the Send Timer is started if it
   was not running already.

   The Probe messages are constructed as explained in Section 6.1,
   except that the State field is set to 1 (Exploring) or 2 (InboundOk),
   depending on which state the sender is in.

     Operational            Exploring             InboundOk
     -----------------------------------------------------------------
     -                      SEND Probe Exploring  SEND Probe InboundOk
                                                  START Send

6.6.  Reception of the Keepalive Message

   Upon the reception of a Keepalive message in the Operational state,
   the node stops the Send Timer if it was running.  If the node is in
   the Exploring state, it transitions to the InboundOK state, sends a
   Probe message, and starts the Send Timer.  The Probe message is
   constructed as explained in Section 6.1.

   In the InboundOK state, the Send Timer is stopped if it was running.

     Operational           Exploring               InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     STOP Send             SEND Probe InboundOk    STOP Send
                           START Send
                           GOTO InboundOk







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6.7.  Reception of the Probe Message State=Exploring

   Upon receiving a Probe message with State set to Exploring, the node
   enters the InboundOK state, sends a Probe message as described in
   Section 6.1, stops the Keepalive Timer if it was running, and
   restarts the Send Timer.

     Operational            Exploring              InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     SEND Probe InboundOk   SEND Probe InboundOk   SEND Probe InboundOk
     STOP Keepalive         START Send             RESTART Send
     RESTART Send           GOTO InboundOk
     GOTO InboundOk

6.8.  Reception of the Probe Message State=InboundOk

   Upon the reception of a Probe message with State set to InboundOk,
   the node sends a Probe message, restarts the Send Timer, stops the
   Keepalive Timer if it was running, and transitions to the Operational
   state.  A new current address pair is chosen for the connection,
   based on the reports of received probes in the message that we just
   received.  If no received probes have been reported, the current
   address pair is unchanged.

   The Probe message is constructed as explained in Section 6.1, except
   that the State field is set to zero (Operational).

    Operational            Exploring              InboundOk
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    SEND Probe Operational SEND Probe Operational SEND Probe Operational
    RESTART Send           RESTART Send           RESTART Send
    STOP Keepalive         GOTO Operational       GOTO Operational

6.9.  Reception of the Probe Message State=Operational

   Upon the reception of a Probe message with State set to Operational,
   the node stops the Send Timer if it was running, starts the Keepalive
   Timer if it was not yet running, and transitions to the Operational
   state.  The Probe message is constructed as explained in Section 6.1,
   except that the State field is set to zero (Operational).

      Note: This terminates the exploration process when both parties
      are happy and know that their peer is happy as well.








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     Operational             Exploring             InboundOk
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
     STOP Send               STOP Send             STOP Send
     START Keepalive         START Keepalive       START Keepalive
                             GOTO Operational      GOTO Operational

   The reachability detection and exploration process has no effect on
   payload communications until a new operational address pair has
   actually been confirmed.  Prior to that, the payload packets continue
   to be sent to the previously used addresses.

6.10.  Graphical Representation of the State Machine

   In the PDF version of this specification, an informational drawing
   illustrates the state machine.  Where the text and the drawing
   differ, the text takes precedence.

7.  Protocol Constants and Variables

   The following protocol constants are defined:

     Initial Probe Timeout      0.5 seconds
     Number of Initial Probes     4 probes

   And these variables have the following default values:

     Send Timeout                15 seconds
     Keepalive Timeout            X seconds, where X is the peer's
                                    Send Timeout as communicated in
                                    the Keepalive Timeout Option
                                 15 seconds if the peer didn't send
                                    a Keepalive Timeout option
     Keepalive Interval           Y seconds, where Y is one-third to
                                    one-half of the Keepalive Timeout
                                    value (see Section 4.1)

   Alternate values of the Send Timeout may be selected by a node and
   communicated to the peer in the Keepalive Timeout Option.  A very
   small value of the Send Timeout may affect the ability to exchange
   keepalives over a path that has a long roundtrip delay.  Similarly,
   it may cause Shim6 to react to temporary failures more often than
   necessary.  As a result, it is RECOMMENDED that an alternate Send
   Timeout value not be under 10 seconds.  Choosing a higher value than
   the one recommended above is also possible, but there is a
   relationship between Send Timeout and the ability of REAP to discover
   and correct errors in the communication path.  In any case, in order
   for Shim6 to be useful, it should detect and repair communication




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   problems long before upper layers give up.  For this reason, it is
   RECOMMENDED that Send Timeout be at most 100 seconds (default TCP R2
   timeout [RFC1122]).

      Note: It is not expected that the Send Timeout or other values
      will be estimated based on experienced roundtrip times.  Signaling
      exchanges are performed based on exponential back-off.  The
      keepalive processes send packets only in the relatively rare
      condition that all traffic is unidirectional.

8.  Security Considerations

   Attackers may spoof various indications from lower layers and from
   the network in an effort to confuse the peers about which addresses
   are or are not operational.  For example, attackers may spoof ICMP
   error messages in an effort to cause the parties to move their
   traffic elsewhere or even to disconnect.  Attackers may also spoof
   information related to network attachments, Router Discovery, and
   address assignments in an effort to make the parties believe they
   have Internet connectivity when in reality they do not.

   This may cause use of non-preferred addresses or even denial of
   service.

   This protocol does not provide any protection of its own for
   indications from other parts of the protocol stack.  Unprotected
   indications SHOULD NOT be taken as a proof of connectivity problems.
   However, REAP has weak resistance against incorrect information even
   from unprotected indications in the sense that it performs its own
   tests prior to picking a new address pair.  Denial-of-service
   vulnerabilities remain, however, as do vulnerabilities against on-
   path attackers.

   Some aspects of these vulnerabilities can be mitigated through the
   use of techniques specific to the other parts of the stack, such as
   properly dealing with ICMP errors [GONT], link-layer security, or the
   use of SEND [RFC3971] to protect IPv6 Router and Neighbor Discovery.

   Other parts of the Shim6 protocol ensure that the set of addresses we
   are switching between actually belong together.  REAP itself provides
   no such assurances.  Similarly, REAP provides some protection against
   third-party flooding attacks [AURA02]; when REAP is run, its Probe
   Nonces can be used as a return routability check that the claimed
   address is indeed willing to receive traffic.  However, this needs to
   be complemented with another mechanism to ensure that the claimed
   address is also the correct node.  Shim6 does this by performing
   binding of all operations to context tags.




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   The keepalive mechanism in this specification is vulnerable to
   spoofing.  On-path attackers that can see a Shim6 context tag can
   send spoofed Keepalive messages once per Send Timeout interval in
   order to prevent two Shim6 nodes from sending Keepalives themselves.
   This vulnerability is only relevant to nodes involved in a one-way
   communication.  The result of the attack is that the nodes enter the
   exploration phase needlessly, but they should be able to confirm
   connectivity unless, of course, the attacker is able to prevent the
   exploration phase from completing.  Off-path attackers may not be
   able to generate spoofed results, given that the context tags are 47-
   bit random numbers.

   To protect against spoofed Keepalive messages, a node implementing
   both Shim6 and IPsec MAY ignore incoming REAP keepalives if it has
   good reason to assume that the other side will be sending IPsec-
   protected return traffic.  In other words, if a node is sending TCP
   payload data, it can reasonably expect to receive TCP ACKs in return.
   If no IPsec-protected ACKs come back but unprotected keepalives do,
   this could be the result of an attacker trying to hide broken
   connectivity.

   The exploration phase is vulnerable to attackers that are on the
   path.  Off-path attackers would find it hard to guess either the
   context tag or the correct probe identifiers.  Given that IPsec
   operates above the Shim6 layer, it is not possible to protect the
   exploration phase against on-path attackers with IPsec.  This is
   similar to the issues with protecting other Shim6 control exchanges.
   There are mechanisms in place to prevent the redirection of
   communications to wrong addresses, but on-path attackers can cause
   denial-of-service, move communications to less-preferred address
   pairs, and so on.

   Finally, the exploration itself can cause a number of packets to be
   sent.  As a result, it may be used as a tool for packet amplification
   in flooding attacks.  It is required that the protocol employing REAP
   has built-in mechanisms to prevent this.  For instance, Shim6
   contexts are created only after a relatively large number of packets
   have been exchanged, a cost that reduces the attractiveness of using
   Shim6 and REAP for amplification attacks.  However, such protections
   are typically not present at connection-establishment time.  When
   exploration would be needed for connection establishment to succeed,
   its usage would result in an amplification vulnerability.  As a
   result, Shim6 does not support the use of REAP in the connection-
   establishment stage.







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9.  Operational Considerations

   When there are no failures, the failure-detection mechanism (and
   Shim6 in general) are lightweight: keepalives are not sent when a
   Shim6 context is idle or when there is traffic in both directions.
   So in normal TCP or TCP-like operations, there would only be one or
   two keepalives when a session transitions from active to idle.

   Only when there are failures is there significant failure-detection
   traffic, especially in the case where a link goes down that is shared
   by many active sessions and by multiple nodes.  When this happens,
   one keepalive is sent and then a series of probes.  This happens per
   active (traffic-generating) context, all of which will time out
   within 15 seconds after the failure.  This makes the peak traffic
   that Shim6 generates after a failure around one packet per second per
   context.  Presumably, the sessions that run over those contexts were
   sending at least that much traffic and most likely more, but if the
   backup path is significantly lower bandwidth than the failed path,
   this could lead to temporary congestion.

      However, note that in the case of multihoming using BGP, if the
      failover is fast enough that TCP doesn't go into slow start, the
      full payload data traffic that flows over the failed path is
      switched over to the backup path, and if this backup path is of a
      lower capacity, there will be even more congestion.

   Although the failure detection probing does not perform congestion
   control as such, the exponential back-off makes sure that the number
   of packets sent quickly goes down and eventually reaches one per
   context per minute, which should be sufficiently conservative even on
   the lowest bandwidth links.

   Section 7 specifies a number of protocol parameters.  Possible tuning
   of these parameters and others that are not mandated in this
   specification may affect these properties.  It is expected that
   further revisions of this specification provide additional
   information after sufficient deployment experience has been obtained
   from different environments.

   Implementations may provide means to monitor their performance and
   send alarms about problems.  Their standardization is, however, the
   subject of future specifications.  In general, Shim6 is most
   applicable for small sites and nodes, and it is expected that
   monitoring requirements on such deployments are relatively modest.
   In any case, where the node is associated with a management system,
   it is RECOMMENDED that detected failures and failover events are





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   reported via asynchronous notifications to the management system.
   Similarly, where logging mechanisms are available on the node, these
   events should be recorded in event logs.

   Shim6 uses the same header for both signaling and the encapsulation
   of payload packets after a rehoming event.  This way, fate is shared
   between the two types of packets, so the situation where reachability
   probes or keepalives can be transmitted successfully but payload
   packets cannot, is largely avoided: either all Shim6 packets make it
   through, so Shim6 functions as intended, or none do, and no Shim6
   state is negotiated.  Even in the situation where some packets make
   it through and others do not, Shim6 will generally either work as
   intended or provide a service that is no worse than in the absence of
   Shim6, apart from the possible generation of a small amount of
   signaling traffic.

   Sometimes payload packets (and possibly payload packets encapsulated
   in the Shim6 header) do not make it through, but signaling and
   keepalives do.  This situation can occur when there is a path MTU
   discovery black hole on one of the paths.  If only large packets are
   sent at some point, then reachability exploration will be turned on
   and REAP will likely select another path, which may or may not be
   affected by the PMTUD black hole.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC3484]  Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
              Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.

   [RFC4429]  Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
              for IPv6", RFC 4429, April 2006.





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   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC5533]  Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
              Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009.

10.2.  Informative References

   [ADD-SEL]  Bagnulo, M., "Address selection in multihomed
              environments", Work in Progress, October 2005.

   [AURA02]   Aura, T., Roe, M., and J. Arkko, "Security of Internet
              Location Management", Proceedings of the 18th Annual
              Computer Security Applications Conference, Las Vegas,
              Nevada, USA, December 2002.

   [BFD]      Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding
              Detection", Work in Progress, February 2009.

   [DNA-SIM]  Krishnan, S. and G. Daley, "Simple procedures for
              Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6", Work in Progress,
              February 2009.

   [GONT]     Gont, F., "ICMP attacks against TCP", Work in Progress,
              October 2008.

   [MULTI6]   Huitema, C., "Address selection in multihomed
              environments", Work in Progress, October 2004.

   [PAIR]     Bagnulo, M., "Default Locator-pair selection algorithm for
              the Shim6 protocol", Work in Progress, October 2008.

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, September 2007.

   [RFC5206]  Nikander, P., Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "End-
              Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity
              Protocol", RFC 5206, April 2008.



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Appendix A.  Example Protocol Runs

   This appendix has examples of REAP protocol runs in typical
   scenarios.  We start with the simplest scenario of two nodes, A and
   B, that have a Shim6 connection with each other but are not currently
   sending any payload data.  As neither side sends anything, they also
   do not expect anything back, so there are no messages at all:

               EXAMPLE 1: No Communications

    Peer A                                        Peer B
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |
      |                                             |

   Our second example involves an active connection with bidirectional
   payload packet flows.  Here, the reception of payload data from the
   peer is taken as an indication of reachability, so again there are no
   extra packets:

          EXAMPLE 2: Bidirectional Communications

    Peer A                                        Peer B
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |<--------------------------------------------|
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |                                             |

   The third example is the first one that involves an actual REAP
   message.  Here, the nodes communicate in just one direction, so REAP
   messages are needed to indicate to the peer that sends payload
   packets that its packets are getting through:







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         EXAMPLE 3: Unidirectional Communications

    Peer A                                        Peer B
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |              Keepalive Nonce=p              |
      |<--------------------------------------------|
      |                                             |
      |              payload packet                 |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |                                             |

   The next example involves a failure scenario.  Here, A has address A,
   and B has addresses B1 and B2.  The currently used address pairs are
   (A, B1) and (B1, A).  All connections via B1 become broken, which
   leads to an exploration process:


























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              EXAMPLE 4: Failure Scenario

    Peer A                                        Peer B
      |                                             |
   State:                                           | State:
   Operational                                      | Operational
      |            (A,B1) payload packet            |
      |-------------------------------------------->|
      |                                             |
      |            (B1,A) payload packet            |
      |<--------------------------------------------| At time T1
      |                                             | path A<->B1
      |            (A,B1) payload packet            | becomes
      |----------------------------------------/    | broken.
      |                                             |
      |           ( B1,A) payload packet            |
      |   /-----------------------------------------|
      |                                             |
      |            (A,B1) payload packet            |
      |----------------------------------------/    |
      |                                             |
      |            (B1,A) payload packet            |
      |   /-----------------------------------------|
      |                                             |
      |            (A,B1) payload packet            |
      |----------------------------------------/    |
      |                                             |
      |                                             | Send Timeout
      |                                             | seconds after
      |                                             | T1, B happens to
      |                                             | see the problem
      |             (B1,A) Probe Nonce=p,           | first and sends a
      |                          state=exploring    | complaint that
      |   /-----------------------------------------| it is not
      |                                             | receiving
      |                                             | anything.
      |                                             | State:
      |                                             | Exploring
      |                                             |
      |             (B2,A) Probe Nonce=q,           |
      |                          state=exploring    | But it's lost,
      |<--------------------------------------------| retransmission
      |                                             | uses another pair
   A realizes                                       |
   that it needs                                    |
   to start the                                     |
   exploration.                                     |
   It picks B2 as the                               |



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   most likely candidate,                           |
   as it appeared in the                            |
   Probe.                                           |
   State: InboundOk                                 |
      |                                             |
      |       (A, B2) Probe Nonce=r,                |
      |                     state=inboundok,        |
      |                     received probe q        | This one gets
      |-------------------------------------------->| through.
      |                                             | State:
      |                                             | Operational
      |       (B2,A) Probe Nonce=s,                 |
      |                    state=operational,       | B now knows
      |                    received probe r         | that A has no
      |<--------------------------------------------| problem receiving
      |                                             | its packets.
   State: Operational                               |
      |                                             |
      |            (A,B2) payload packet            |
      |-------------------------------------------->| Payload packets
      |                                             | flow again.
      |            (B2,A) payload packet            |
      |<--------------------------------------------|

   The next example shows when the failure for the current locator pair
   is in the other direction only.  A has addresses A1 and A2, and B has
   addresses B1 and B2.  The current communication is between A1 and B1,
   but A's packets no longer reach B using this pair.























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           EXAMPLE 5: One-Way Failure

 Peer A                                        Peer B
   |                                             |
State:                                           | State:
Operational                                      | Operational
   |                                             |
   |           (A1,B1) payload packet            |
   |-------------------------------------------->|
   |                                             |
   |           (B1,A1) payload packet            |
   |<--------------------------------------------|
   |                                             |
   |           (A1,B1) payload packet            | At time T1
   |----------------------------------------/    | path A1->B1
   |                                             | becomes
   |                                             | broken.
   |           (B1,A1) payload packet            |
   |<--------------------------------------------|
   |                                             |
   |           (A1,B1) payload packet            |
   |----------------------------------------/    |
   |                                             |
   |           (B1,A1) payload packet            |
   |<--------------------------------------------|
   |                                             |
   |           (A1,B1) payload packet            |
   |----------------------------------------/    |
   |                                             |
   |                                             | Send Timeout
   |                                             | seconds after
   |                                             | T1, B notices
   |                                             | the problem and
   |          (B1,A1) Probe Nonce=p,             | sends a
   |                        state=exploring      | complaint that
   |<--------------------------------------------| it is not
   |                                             | receiving
   |                                             | anything.
A responds.                                      | State: Exploring
State: InboundOk                                 |
   |                                             |
   |      (A1, B1) Probe Nonce=q,                |
   |                     state=inboundok,        |
   |                     received probe p        |
   |----------------------------------------/    | A's response
   |                                             | is lost.
   |         (B2,A2) Probe Nonce=r,              |
   |                       state=exploring       | Next, try a different



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   |<--------------------------------------------| locator pair.
   |                                             |
   |     (A2, B2) Probe Nonce=s,                 |
   |                    state=inboundok,         |
   |                    received probes p, r     | This one gets
   |-------------------------------------------->| through.
   |                                             | State: Operational
   |                                             |
   |                                             | B now knows
   |                                             | that A has no
   |      (B2,A2) Probe Nonce=t,                 | problem receiving
   |                    state=operational,       | its packets and
   |                    received probe s         | that A's probe
   |<--------------------------------------------| gets to B.  It
   |                                             | sends a
State: Operational                               | confirmation to A.
   |                                             |
   |           (A2,B2) payload packet            |
   |-------------------------------------------->| Payload packets
   |                                             | flow again.
   |           (B1,A1) payload packet            |
   |<--------------------------------------------|

Appendix B.  Contributors

   This document attempts to summarize the thoughts and unpublished
   contributions of many people, including MULTI6 WG design team members
   Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Erik Nordmark, Geoff Huston, Kurtis Lindqvist,
   Margaret Wasserman, and Jukka Ylitalo; MOBIKE WG contributors Pasi
   Eronen, Tero Kivinen, Francis Dupont, Spencer Dawkins, and James
   Kempf; and HIP WG contributors such as Pekka Nikander.  This document
   is also in debt to work done in the context of SCTP [RFC4960] and the
   Host Identity Protocol (HIP) multihoming and mobility extension
   [RFC5206].

Appendix C.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would also like to thank Christian Huitema, Pekka Savola,
   John Loughney, Sam Xia, Hannes Tschofenig, Sebastien Barre, Thomas
   Henderson, Matthijs Mekking, Deguang Le, Eric Gray, Dan Romascanu,
   Stephen Kent, Alberto Garcia, Bernard Aboba, Lars Eggert, Dave Ward,
   and Tim Polk for interesting discussions in this problem space, and
   for review of this specification.








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Authors' Addresses

   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com


   Iljitsch van Beijnum
   IMDEA Networks
   Avda. del Mar Mediterraneo, 22
   Leganes, Madrid  28918
   Spain

   EMail: iljitsch@muada.com


































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